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NOTES AND

COMMENTS

over the fund as a price to becoming surety." It is likewise beside
the point as to whether or not the surety is a "paid" one, for even
a compensated surety has rights before the law. The fundamental
fact remains that the creditor who makes such an application of
payment in derogation of the rights of the surety is acting inequitably and should be held to account.
The modern trend, if there is one, seems to be against the compensated surety unless he can show an actual fraud on his rights.
Some indication of a change may be seen in more recent federal
cases, 17 but until the state courts return to fundamental principles
of justice in this regard, the law will remain in a state of confusion. 18
D. A. ESLIN

CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF TAXPA ,CERS
-WHETHER TAXPAYER MUST MAKE DEMAND UPON MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AS CONDITION PRECEDENT TO FILING SUIT IN ITS NAME AND
ON ITS BEHALF-The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District
recently had occasion to consider, in People ex rel. City of Chicago
v. Schreiber,' the circumstances under which a taxpayer might bring
suit in the name of and on behalf of a municipal corporation against
a public officer to recover funds allegedly improperly retained by
the latter.2 A prior suit had been filed by a taxpayer to compel an
accounting of such money and it was his contention that since his
suit had been filed first, it was a bar to a subsequent mandamus
- In Salt Lake City v. O'Co~ior, 68 Utah 233 at 242, 249 P. 810 at 814
(1926), however, the court said: "When a surety . . . permits money on the
contract to be paid the contractor unconditionally, which it must know he may
use for general purposes, we see no sufficient reason for sustaining any claim
or equity in behalf of the surety, in such money, after it has been paid to
another in the due course of business. The risk of such loss is one of the hazards which the surety, for a fixed consideration, assumes by its contract." See
also Standard Oil Co. v. Day, 161 Minn. 281, 201 N. W. 410, 41 A. L. R. 1291
(1924); Grover v. Board of Education, 102 N. J. Eq. 415, 141 A. 81 (1928),
affirmed in 104 N. J. Eq. 197, 144 A. 918 (1929); Grace Harbor Lumber Co. v.
Ortman, 190 Mich. 429, 157 N. W. 96 (1916).
17 In Maryland Casualty Co. v. City of South Norfolk, 54 F. (2d) 1032 (1932),
the court permitted the creditor to apply. the fund as he saw fit. One year
later, in United States v. Johnson, Smathers & Rollins, 67 F.. (2d) 121 at 123
(1933), the same court declared that where payment is made to the creditor
with the "identical money for the payment of which the surety is bound" such
fund must go toward the extinguishment of the secured debt.
Is Although the federal courts may formulate their own rules as to bonds
on federal contracts, they must still be guided by state decisions on state
matters by reason of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L.
Ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938).
1322 Ill. App. 452, 54 N. E. (2d) 862 (1944).
2It appeared that a city clerk had collected fees for issuing state fishing and
hunting licenses and had retained a portion of the amounts collected as a commission which, it was contended, should have been turned over to the city
treasury. The court held that the sums so retained were not fees and earnings
of the city clerk under fll. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, §172, but belonged to the
official in his private capacity.
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action brought by the municipal corporation for the same purpose.
To advance his contention, he sought leave to intervene in the city's
action but his petition was denied. Upon appeal from such order,
it was decided that the taxpayer had no standing in court in the
absence of a showing or at least an allegation that the proper city
official had refused or failed to institute proceedings after notice
and demand.
The Illinois Appellate Court, by so holding for the first time in
the history of this state, has added Illinois to the list of jurisdictions which have already answered the question in the same fashion.
Early decisions on the subject proceeded from an analogy to suits
brought by stockholders against officers of private corporations
where the rule prevails that such stockholder should first make a
demand upon the directors before he may bring suit in the name
of the corporation. 3 In some jurisdictions, however, the necessity
for such a demand in the case of municipal corporations is imposed
by statutory enactment which may even go so far as to prescribe
the form of the demand.4 It has been5 held that such statutory requirements must be followed strictly.
While Illinois has no statute directly in point, it has a law regarding suits to prevent the disbursements of public funds. The purpose
of that statute was clearly expressed in the case of Hill v. County
of La Salle,7 where it was said that: "Prior to the enactment of the
statute a taxpayer might institute, as a matter of right, a suit to
restrain State officers, as well as other public officers, from disbursing public funds. These suits were often well founded, but when
prosecuted for some ulterior or malicious motive they might, and
sometimes did, seriously embarrass the proper administration of
public affairs. When the right of a public officer charged with the
duty and responsibility of the proper application of public funds
to disburse such funds is challenged by a lawsuit, it is obvious that
for his own protection he will refuse to pay out the money in his
custody until the suit is finally adjudicated. Hence the General
Assembly, as a check upon the indiscriminate institution of such
suits, provided by the act of June 21, 1917, that when a taxpayer
seeks to enjoin a State officer from disbursing public funds, he must
by a petition show that there is reasonable ground for filing the bill
and obtain leave for that purpose. The act provides a summary
proceeding to determine whether a bill in equity to enjoin the disbursement of public moneys by State officers is justified and should
be filed, and by that proceeding seeks to prevent unwarranted inters Reed v. Cunningham, 126 Ia. 302, 101 N. W. 1055 (1905); Merrimon v. Southern Paving & Construction Co., 142 N. Car. 539, 55 S. E. 366 (1906).
4 State v. School District No. 97, Blaine County, 186 Okla. 177, 97 P. (2d) 548
(1939).
, State v. Muskogee Iron Works, 187 Okla. 419, 103 P. (2d) 101 (1940).
6 111. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 102, §§11, 12, and 14.
7326 fl. 508, 158 N. E. 112 (1927).
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ference with the performance of certain public duties." 8 It is questionable, however, whether this provision could, by any stretch of
the imagination, be extended to cover the type of situation involved
in the instant case.
To the general rule noted above, there has been added an exception to the effect that where circumstances exist which would make
demand futile, the taxpayer may bring suit without a prior demand
and refusal.9 Such exception is usually based on general grounds
of logic and policy. It has, however, occasionally been supported
by the added analogy of the private corporation situation wherein
a stockholder may sometimes sue without prior demand, particularly
where it appears that such a demand would be futile or might even
.provide an opportunity for the guilty directors or officers to dissipate
the corporate assets before a reasonable time elapsed after demand.' 0
Justified though such exception may be where there is no statutory
requirement for a demand, it might not obtain if there is a positive
statutory requirement as is the case in at least the state of Oklahoma.1 1 Since the statute law of Illinois is silent on the subject,
it would seem to be reasonable that the court in the instant case
should state that the general rule is "that a demand upon the
proper public official to bring suit in the name and on behalf of the
city is a condition precedent to the maintenance of a taxpayer's
suit, unless it is shown that such a demand would be useless." 12
Although the last clause was pure dictum, the court seems clearly
8 326 Ill. 508 at 515, 158 N. E. 112 at 115.
9 Mock v. City of Santa Rosa, 126 Cal. 330, 58 P.

826 (1899); Sechrist v.
Rialto Irr. Dist., 129 Cal. 640, 62 P. 261 (1900); Briare v. Mathews, 202 Cal. 1,
258 P. 939 (1927); Newberry v. Evans, 97 Cal. App. 120, 275 P. 465 (1929);
Shipp v. Rodes, 196 Ky. 523, 245 S. W. 157 (1922); Taylor v. Todd, 241 Ky. 605,
44 S. W. (2d) 606 (1932); Commonwealth v. Mauney, 258 Ky. 429, 80 S. W.
(2d) 568 (1935); Pike County v. Young, 266 Ky. 588, 99 S. W. (2d) 749 (1936):
Ward v. Buckingham, 268 Ky. 297, 104 S. W. (2d) 994 (1937); Regan v. Babcock, 188 Minn. 192, 247 N. W. 12 (1933); School Dist. No. 2 of Silver Bow
County v. Richards, 62 Mont. 141, 205 P. 206 (1922); Jones v. Town of North
Wilkesboro, 150 N. Car. 646, 64 S. E. 866 (1909); Atkinson v. Greene, 197 N.
Car. 118, 147 S. E. 811 (1929); State v. Hunt, 132 Ohio St. 568, 9 N. E. (2d)
676 (1937); Hoekman v. Iowa Civil Tp., 28 S. D. 206, 132 N. W. 1004 (1911);
Burns v. City of Nashville, 142 Tenn. 541, 221 S. W. 828 (1920); Malone v.
Peay, 157 Tenn. 429, 7 S. W. (2d) 40 (1928); City of Corpus Christi v. Flato,
83 S. W. (2d) 433 (Tex. Civ. App.) (1935); Sauer v. Monroe, 171 Va. 421, 199
S. E. 487 (1938); Beyer v. Town of Crandon, 98 Wis. 306, 73 N. W. 771 (1898);
In re Cole's Estate, 102 Wis. 1, 78 N. W. 402 (1899); Egaard v. School Dist.
No. 5, 109 Wis. 366, 85 N. W. 369 (1901); Northern Trust Co. v. Snyder, 113
Wis. 516, 89 N. W. 460 (1902); Wilcox v. Porth, 154 Wis. 422, 143 N. W. 165
(1913); Ryan v. Olson, 183 Wis. 290, 197 N. W. 727 (1924); Coyle v. Richter,
203 Wis. 590, 234 N. W. 906 (1931); Shulz v. Kissling, 228 Wis. 282, 280 N. W.
388 (1938); Reetz v. Kitch, 230 Wis. 1, 283 N. W. 348 (1939).
lo Osburn v. Stone, 170 Cal. 480, 150 P. 367 (1915); Burns v. Essling, 154
Minn. 304, 191 N. W. 899 (1923); Murphy v. City of Greensboro, 190 N. Car. 268,
129 S. E. 614 (1925); Peeler v. Luther, 175 Tenn. 454, 135 S. W. (2d) 926
(1940).
" Vaughan v. Latta, 168 Okla. 492, 33 P. (2d) 795 (1934).
12322 Ill.App. 452 at 483, 54 N. E. (2d) 862 at 875.
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to indicate that the entire rule together with its exception is to be
regarded as the law of this jurisdiction.
Assuming that a demand had been made in the instant case, there
would still have remained the question of whether the taxpayer's
suit had been filed prematurely. The purpose of the demand is to
allow the proper public official a reasonable opportunity to take
action on behalf of the public and in its name. The institution of
suit by the taxpayer after demand but before the lapse of a reasonable time would defeat the purpose of such notice. It has been held,
therefore, that where written demand was left on the proper official's
desk the day before the suit was filed, the hurry on the plaintiff's
part was unreasonable. 13 Even where notice and demand is required
by statute, the suit may be premature if filed almost a month after
demand has been served according to one case,' 4 but in another
jurisdiction it was held that inaction for seventeen days was sufficient to evidence a refusal to act. 15
The practitioner contemplating suit on behalf of a taxpayer hereafter, would do well to observe these requirements if he expects to
sustain his action against a motion to dismiss filed under Section 48
of the Illinois Civil Practice Act.1
G. MASCHINOT
PARTIES-PLAINTIFFS--WHETHER OR NOT A PERSON SUING AS REPRESENTATIVE OF A CLASS MUST SHOW A COMMON OR JOINT INTEREST
WITH THOSE REPRESENTED NOT ONLY IN THE QUESTION LITIGATED
BUT ALSO IN THE REMEDY SOUGHT-In the case of Newberry Library

v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago,' plaintiff sued to
recover on certain refunding bonds issued by defendant. A motion
to dismiss in the nature of a plea in abatement 2 was made by
defendant on the ground that another action was pending between
the same parties for the same cause. Such prior suit 3 had been instituted by another plaintiff as a "class" suit and it was contended
that the plaintiff in the instant case was adequately and properly
represented therein hence not entitled to maintain a separate action.
Defendant had previously sought to limit the prior action to the
individual rights of the plaintiff therein on the theory that he could
not maintain a representative suit, but the court hearing that case
is Nunnold v. City of Toledo, 52 Ohio App. 172, 3 N. E. (2d) 550 (1935).
14 State v. Ford, 189 Okla. 299, 116 P. (2d) 988 (1941), where demand was
served September 7, suit filed October 5, but the County Attorney filed his own
suit on the following February 16. A dissent was based on the impossibility of
determining whether the County's suit would be prosecuted diligently.
15 Land v. Lewis, 291 Ky. 800, 165 S. W. (2d) 553 (1942).
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §172.
1387 Ill. 85, 55 N. E. (2d) 147 (1944).
21Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §172(d), permits the use of a verified motion in
such situations.
aDelevitt v. The Board of Education, No. 43 C 9566, Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois. That action was still pending in the nisi prius court when the
instant case was decided, hence is not to be found in the appellate reports as
yet.
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had denied such request." As a consequence of such prior action,
defendant felt that the decision declaring the former proceeding to
be a representative suit was res adjudicata on the question. The
trial court in the instant case, acting on that same theory, sustained
the motion and dismissed the suit as being unnecessary. On direct
appeal,5 the Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded when it
found that the prior suit was not, in fact, a representative suit and
concluded that any order entered therein had no binding effect on
the plaintiff-appellant.
The doctrine of virtual representation has long been recognized
by courts of equity as an exception to the general rule that all necessary and indispensable parties should be joined either as plaintiffs
or defendants.- For that reason, a court of equity will entertain a
suit brought by one or a few who are members of the class, provided
it clearly appears to be brought not only on behalf of the actual
plaintiffs but also for the benefit of all members of that class, so
long as it is demonstrated that (1) the question is one of common
or general interest, (2) the parties form a voluntary association"
and those who sue or defend may fairly be presumed to represent
the rights of the whole group; or (3) the parties are very numerous
and although they have, or may have, separate and distinct7 interests
yet it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.
The function and purpose of such a class suit is well summarized
in a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in the following language: "The class suit was an invention of equity to
enable it to proceed to a decree in suits where the number of those
interested in the subject of the litigation is so great that their joinder
as parties in conformity to the usual rules of procedure is impracticable. Courts are not infrequently called upon to proceed with
causes in which the number of those interested in the litigation is
so great as to make difficult or impossible the joinder of all because
some are not within the jurisdiction or because their whereabouts
is unknown or where if all were made parties to the suit its continued abatement by the death of some would prevent or unduly
delay a decree." 1 This convenient method of dealing with what
would otherwise be an insurmountable situation is now so well recognized that if either of the factors mentioned above be found to exist
the decree handed down in such a case will be binding as well upon
4 No appeal had been taken from such ruling as it was not a "final" order
within the meaning of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §201.
5 Direct appeal was proper, under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §199, because
constitutional issues concerning due process were raised and directly passed on
in the trial court. The argument was that, by denying the plaintiff a right to
maintain its own action, a violation of Ill. Const. 1870, Art. I1, §2, and of the
14th Amendment of the U. S. Const., §1, had occurred.
e Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U. S. (16 How.) 288, 14 L. Ed. 942 (1853).
7 See Story, Equity Pleadings, 9th Ed., §97.
a Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32 at 41, 61 S. Ct. 115, 85 L. Ed. 22 at 27, 132
A. L. R. 741 at 746 (1940).
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those who are not formal parties as those who are, provided those
who sue can be said fairly to represent the former.9 Should the
former desire not to have their rights adjudicated in such fashion
they must obtain permission to intervene in the class suit. 0
The Illinois courts, at quite an early date, accepted the doctrine
of virtual representation at least in part" and the right of the individual to sue,' 2 or be sued,"3 on behalf of the many where certain
of the requirements of a class suit are met has gone unquestioned
ever -since. Similarly, decrees entered in such suits have been held
to have the same binding effect as if the persons so represented were
actually present.' By measuring the alleged former action involved
in the instant case along the yardstick of this doctrine, it should
be possible to determine whether or not it falls accurately within
the category of a class suit.
9 Hartford L. Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U. S. 662, 35 S. Ct. 692, 59 L. Ed. 1165,
L. R. A. 1916A 765 (1915); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 61 S. Ct. 115, 85
L. Ed. 22, 132 A. L. R. 741 (1940). See also Freeman, Judgments, 5th Ed.,
Vol. 1, §§435-6.
ioHairgrove v. City of Jacksonville, 366 Ill. 163, 8 N. E. (2d) 187 (1937),
noted in 15 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 337.
" Carter v. Rodewald, 108 Ill. 351 (1884).
"2Plaintiff has been permitted to sue in a representative capacity under the
first exception in Carter v. Rodewald, 108 Ill. 351 (1884); Groves v. Farmers
State Bank of Woodlawn, 368 Ill. 35, 12 N. E. (2d) 618 (1938); Snyder v.
Aetna Const. Co., 272 Ill. App. 591 (1933); Flanagan v. City of Chicago, 311
Ill. App. 135, 35 N. E. (2d) 545 (1941), but the right was denied, because of an
adverse interest to the class, in Langson v. Goldberg, 373 Ill. 297, 26 N.
E. (2d) 111 (1940), affirming 298 Ill. App. 229, 18 N. E. (2d) 729 (1939);
South East Nat. Bank v. Board of Education, 298 Ill. App. 92, 18 N. E. (2d) 584
(1938), or because another representative suit was already pending, in Leonard
v. Bye, 361 Ill. 185, 197 N. E. 546 (1935). Action has also been permitted where
the representative plaintiff was a member of a voluntary association, under
the second exception, in Guilfoil v. Arthur, 158 Ill. 600, 41 N. E. 1009 (1895).
Cases falling under the third exception have been rejected in Peoples Store of
Roseland v. McKibbin, 379 Ill. 148, 39 N. E. (2d) 995 (1942), and Fetherston v.
National Republic Bancorp., 280 Ill. App. 151 (1935), leave to appeal denied
280 Ill. App. xiv, but have been permitted if the sole remedy sought was injunctive relief, despite the assertion of multifariousness, in City of Chicago v.
Collins, 175 Ill. 445, 51 N. E. 907 (1898), and Chicago Telephone Co. v. Illinois
Mfrs. Ass'n, 106 Ill. App. 54 (1903).
13 Insofar as suits against representative defendants are concerned, most of
the cases involve situations where living defendants have been held to be the
representatives of unboin persons who might become members of the class:
Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227, 33 N. E. 858 (1893); McCampbell v. Mason, 151 Ill.
500, 38 N. E. 672 (1894); Gavin v. Curtin, 171 Ill 640, 49 N. E. 523 (1898);
Fienhold v. Babcock, 275 Ill. 282, 113 N. E. 962 (1916); Longworth v. Duff, 297
Ill. 479, 130 N. E. 690 (1921); Carey v. Carey, 309 Ill. 330, 141 N. E. 156 (1923);
Easton v. Hall, 323 Ill. 397, 154 N. E. 216 (1926), or where a common interest
has been found to exist: Cales v. Dressler, 315 Ill. 142, 146 N. E. 162 (1925);
Nelson v. Amling, 319 Ill. App. 571, 49 N. E. (2d) 868 (1943). Cases which
deny such right all turn on the point that the alleged representatives were
possessed of an adverse interest, as in Weberpals v. Jenny, 300 Ill. 145, 133 N. E.
62 (1921); Mortimore v. Bashore, 317 Ill. 535, 148 N. U. 317 (1925), or that the
rights of the unborn persons were not adequately preserved by the decree:
Dole v. Shaw, 282 Ill. 642, 118 N. E. 1044 (1918). No cases of representation
by defendants falling under the second and third exceptions appear to exist.
14 Harmon v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 123 Ill. 122, 13 N. E. 161 (1887).
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It can be admitted that such action does not fall within the first
exception since the representative plaintiff and those whom he
claimed to represent lacked that "commbn interest" which is there
regarded as essential. Although the parties were owners of bonds.
of the same issue, were met with the same objection to payment,
and were all interested in the same type of recovery, still, as their
purchases arose out of separate transactions and were not jointly
made, their rights were truly independent of each other. To qualify
under that exception, such joint interest. is required as would be
found in the case of beneficiaries under the same trust,1 6 shareholders
in the same corporation, 17 or creditors seeking to enforce a common
liability designed for their joint benefit. 18 As each of the parties
was legally concerned only in his own particular claim, it is clear
that the case did not meet the requirement of the first exception.
It may also be admitted that the second exception was not satisfied
for it was nowhere contended that the several parties concerned
were members of a voluntary unincorporated association."9
The third exception, however, permits class suits where the parties are very numerous even though they have, or may have, separate and distinct interests, because it is impracticable to bring
them all before the court. Illustrations of the application of that
exception have been provided most often in cases where the class
20
being represented stood in the position of defendants to the action,
but there are cases where one has been allowed to sue as plaintiff
on behalf of many in the same general position even though their
rights were separate and distinct.1 If that exception were permitted
to prevail in Illinois, it is submitted that the instant case would fit
within such exception for, although each bondholder was concerned
1 Joint action might have been taken by them pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943,
Ch. 110, §147, but that statute contemplates a mere amalgamation of separate
claims in one suit for convenient dispatch. There is no provision in the Civil
Practice Act relating to representative suits.
16 Flanagan v. City of Chicago, 311 Ill. App. 135, 35 N. E. (2d) 545 (1941).
The rationale of this case can rest only on the assumption that a fund raised
from many individual special assessments constitutes a "trust" fund for the
Joint benefit of the several taxpayers, otherwise the situation there concerned
would seem to be identical with the instant case.
17 Snyder v. Aetna Const. Co., 272 Ill. App. 591 (1933).
18 Groves v. Farmers State Bank of Woodlawn, 368 Ill. 35, 12 N. E. (2d) 618
(1938).
19 For an instance of a representative suit in such situation, see Guilfoil v.
Arthur, 158 Ill. 600, 41 N. E. 1009 (1895).
20 In
City of London v. Perkins, 3 Bro. P. C. 602, 1 Eng. Rep. 1524 (1734), the
city was allowed to maintain such a suit to establish its right to a certain duty
against a few defendants who dealt in the goods in question although the decision
might affect all of the people of England. Mayor of York v. Pilkington, 1 Atk.
282, 26 Eng. Rep. 180 (1737), was a case in which the plaintiff's right to a
fishery was upheld against the defendants, even though the latter relied on
separate and distinct rights.
21 Good v. Blewitt, 13 Ves. Jun. 397, 33 Eng. Rep. 343 (1807); Adair v. The
New River Company, 11 Ves. jun. 429, 82 Eng. Rep. 1153 (1805); Chancey v.
May, Prec. Ch. (Finch) 592, 24 Eng. Rep. 265 (1722).
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only with his own immediate right, the issue as to each appeared,
on the surface at least, to be identical, i.e. that the entire issue of
bonds, no matter by whom held, was void.2 2 As the parties were
.apparently very numerous, perhaps even unknown, and a multiplicity of suits would become necessary if each was obliged to bring a
seem to call for its
separate suit, the spirit of the exception would
23
application to the situation thus presented.
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, has never seen fit to recognize the third exception but has limited class suits to cases falling
within the first two groups only. Attempts in the past to maintain
such actions on the sole ground that the persons who should be
plaintiffs are too numerous to bring before the court have been
rejected,2 4 and, by the decision in the instant case, the court has
indicated that it is unwilling to change that view. Such feeling seems
to be dictated by a fear that due process will be denied to those thus
represented since their rights may be determined without their
knowledge and without providing them with an individual day in
court. No similar fear has led the court to deny the right to sue as
a representative in the other exceptional situations, even where the
persons so represented are as yet unborn, hence there seems to be
no logical basis for the apprehension that constitutional rights will
be infringed. So long as the representative plaintiff can be said to
be a fair representative of the class, that is one who will present
all arguments and contentions which would be favorable to the
group, it should make little difference whether he is a joint or common owner with the others or is only concerned with securing a
decision on a common question which concerns all. Perhaps, since
the court has not shown a willingness to utilize the whole concept
of the class suit, it is time that the subject should be made the
25
basis for statutory regulation in Illinois as is the case elsewhere.
T. F. BAYER
22 The pleadings in the Delevitt suit alleged that the refusal to pay the coupon
then due was based on the Board's claim that all the bonds and interest coupons
were invalid.
23 Although other and different defences might be urged against the several
holders, the fundamental issue in the case would seem to be the same and there
was no indication that the plaintiff in the Delevitt case was not a competent
person to sue on behalf of all. Of course, had his interest been antagonistic to
the rights of those he claimed to represent or was bringing the suit for collusive
purposes, the action in denying him the right of representation would be highly
proper: Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 61 S. Ct. 115, 85 L. Ed. 22 (1940).
24 Fetherston v. National Republic Bancorp, 280 111. App. 151 (1935), leave to
appeal denied 280 Ill. App. xiv; Peoples Store of Roseland v. McKibbin, 379 Ill.
148, 39 N. E. (2d) 995 (1942).
25 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23(a) (3), 28 U. S. C. A. following
§723c, permits such suits, even though the character of the right sought to be
enforced is several, where "there is a common-question of law or fact affecting
the several rights and a common relief is sought." Thompson, Laws of New
York, 1939, Part II, Civil Practice Act, §195. See also Sunderland, "The New
Federal Rules," 45 W. Va. L. Q. 5 (1938), particularly p. 16.

